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Abstract
This paper discusses and outlines a perspective on economic growth based on evolutionary theorizing. Consistent with
this perspective, capitalist development is shown to be a process of alternating periods of convergence and divergence, with
some signs of a shift towards divergence recently. We also show that the importance of innovation for economic growth has
increased lately, while at the same time imitation, (or diffusion) has become more demanding. The manufacturing sector
which used to be very important for growth has lost much of its dynamism. We relate these ﬁndings to the big technological
shifts that have occurred during the last decades.
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1. Introduction
In their path breaking book An Evolutionary Theory
of Economic Change (1982), Richard Nelson and Sid-
ney Winter suggested that theoretical progress should
be understood as interaction between two different
levels of theorizing: formal theory and appreciative
theory. While the former is described as logical and
mathematical, the latter is said to be closer to em-
pirical work, to which it is assumed to provide both
guidance and interpretation. “In a well-working scien-
tiﬁc discipline”, they argue, “the ﬂow of inﬂuence is
not only from formal to appreciative theorizing, but in
the reverse direction as well. Phenomena identiﬁed in
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applied work that resist analysis with familiar models,
and rather causal if perceptive explanations for these,
become the grist for the formal theoretical mill. Some-
what informal explanations in the style of apprecia-
tive theory are abstracted, sharpened, and made more
rigorous”. (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 47). It was
NelsonandWinter’sviewthattheorthodoxy’s(asthey
called it) neglect of appreciative theorizing was one
important reason behind the failure of the discipline
to cope with many important real world phenomena.
Arguably, the distinction between formal and ap-
preciative theorizing may also be important for under-
standing the ﬁeld of evolutionary economics itself. On
one hand, there is an important body of formal work
on evolutionary modeling, following the initial contri-
butions by Nelson and Winter and others. This work
is often inspired by evolutionary biology and draws
on mathematical tools that have become popular
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in biology and other natural sciences. However, the
term evolutionary economics is also often associated
with a less formal (or more ‘appreciative’) approach
in economics that focus on evolution as a process of
qualitative change in historical time, driven by ﬁrms,
governments and other organizations (rather than in-
dividuals) with a diverse set of motivations, decisions
rules and capabilities (rather than optimizing behav-
ior and perfect information). The economists Joseph
Schumpeter and, more recently, Christopher Freeman
are certainly central contributors to this literature
as are many economic historians such as for exam-
ple, Alexander Gerschenkron, Moses Abramovitz
and Nathan Rosenberg. The relationship between the
writings of these authors and biological approaches
is at best an indirect one. Schumpeter, for instance,
explicitly denounced the applications of biological ap-
proaches in social science (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 778).
What we in earlier work have called “the tech-
nology gap theory of economic growth” (Fagerberg,
1987, 1988b) is in our view also an example of ap-
preciative theorizing. It emerged mainly because of
the failure of formal growth theories to recognize
the role of innovation and diffusion of technology
in global economic growth (Fagerberg, 1994). These
formal theories either ignored innovation-diffusion
altogether, or assumed that technology is a global
public good created outside the economic sphere, and
therefore could (should) be ignored by economists.
However, it became obvious for many students of
long-run growth that the perspective on which this
formal theorizing was based had little to offer in un-
derstanding the actual growth processes. Rather than
a global public good, available to everyone for free, it
became clear to observers that there were large tech-
nological differences (or gaps) between rich and poor
countries, and that engaging in technological catch-up
(narrowing the technology gap) was perhaps the most
promising avenue that poor countries could follow for
achieving long-run growth. But the very fact that tech-
nology is not a global public good, i.e. that such tech-
nological differences are not easily overcome, implies
that although the prospect of technological catch-up is
promising, it is also challenging, not only technolog-
ically, but also institutionally (Gerschenkron, 1962).
Moreover, since, as emphasized by Schumpeter, eco-
nomic growth is a process of qualitative change (with
leading technologies and perhaps industries changing
through time), engaging in technological catch-up is
like trying to hit a moving target. Hence, as pointed
out by several prominent students of long-run growth
(Svennilson, 1954; Cornwall, 1977; Freeman and
Louçã, 2001), technological catch-up is not a ques-
tion of replacing an outdated technological set up
with a more modern one, but to continually transform
technological, economic and institutional structures.
In the next section, we discuss (appreciative and
formal) evolutionary theorizing in a bit more detail
and outline a perspective on economic growth that will
be applied later in the paper. Section 3 is concerned
with one of the main conclusions from Section 2,
namely that capitalist development is not necessarily
a convergence process, as some theories in this area
predict. Rather, it is likely to be a process of alter-
nating periods of convergence and divergence as the
evidence presented in Section 3 indeed suggests. For
instance, there are now signs of a diverging trend
emergingintheglobaleconomy(afterarelativelylong
period of essentially converging trends). Section 4
relates to the other main conclusion from Section 2,
namely that different historical periods (and growth
patterns) are characterized by different technological
dynamics and hence that the factors that matter for
growth (including adequate institutional settings and
policies) are likely to differ as well. We show that the
importance of innovation for economic growth has
increased lately, while at the same time imitation (or
diffusion) has become more demanding. The manu-
facturing sector, which used to be very important for
growth, has lost much of its dynamism. We relate
these ﬁndings to the big technological shifts that have
occurred during the last decades. The ﬁnal section
summarizes the lessons from the study.
2. Evolutionary economics and technology
dynamics
We have already argued that the term ‘evolutionary
economics’ should not be reserved to applications of
strict biological metaphors to the study of economics.
The term evolutionary economics is also associated
with a less formal (or more ‘appreciative’) strand in
economics that focus on evolution as a process of
qualitative change and the roles of technology and in-
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draw inspiration from Schumpeter’s (1912) notion of
disequilibrium dynamics resulting from the introduc-
tion of (basic) innovations. Examples of this approach
are Fagerberg (1987, 1988a), Freeman and Soete
(1987, 1990) Dosi et al. (1990) or Verspagen (1991).
A central approach in this literature has been to
think of the ‘social system’ as composed of different
‘domains’, e.g. the techno-economic domain and the
socio-institutional domain (Perez, 1983), or the sep-
arate domains of science, technology, economy, pol-
itics and culture (Freeman and Louçã, 2001). Each of
these domains has its own dynamics and explanatory
processes, but what is important is that the domains
exert strong mutual inﬂuences.1 Following this ap-
proach, any ’model’ that limits itself to pure economic
factors (such as R&D, capital investment or human
capital) provides a much too narrow perspective on
economic growth.
The perspective offered by these writers is one of
the world economy as a process of constant transfor-
mation. Technologies and institutions change through
time, and what drives economic growth in one era
(e.g. economies of scale in relation to mass produc-
tion) might become much less important, or substi-
tuted by a different factor (e.g. network economics)
in a different era. In terms of economic growth rates,
such a process is quite different from the neo-classical
notion of steady state growth. OECD (2000), under
the heading of, “The changing role of innovation in
growth performance”, discusses a number of trans-
formations that are good examples of the processes
we have in mind. Among the factors mentioned, there
are shortening technology cycles, changes in ﬁnancial
markets enabling easier ﬁnancing of innovative activ-
ities (venture capital), the increasing role of networks
and alliances in technology development, and the
closer link to science. We will, however, not discuss
all these factors in detail here.
The notion of the world economy as a constant
process of transformation is perhaps most clearly re-
ﬂected in the literature on ‘long-waves’ and ‘techno-
logical revolutions’. This literature, which dates back
1 Examples of such interaction are the impact of European inte-
gration (a process that started very much as a way of stabilizing
Europe in a political way after the 1940s) on economic growth
(Fagerberg et al., 1999), the impact of culture on regional inno-
vation systems (Saxenian, 1994), or the inﬂuence of ﬁrm organi-
zation on economic growth (Von Tunzelmann, 1995).
to Schumpeter (1939), has later been reﬁned and ex-
tended by contributions such as Freeman et al. (1982),
Kleinknecht (1987), Van Duijn (1983) and Freeman
and Louçã (2001). Although, the dating of a such
waves ﬁgures as an important issue in some of these
contributions, we are more concerned with the overall
perspective on growth offered by this literature.2 The
basic hypothesis (as we see it) is that the introduc-
tion times of important innovations are clustered in
time. A ‘bunch’ of innovations may lead an upswing
of economic growth once it creates a bandwagon of
follow-up, incremental innovations. However, after
the new technological paradigm (the term is Dosi’s,
1982) has diffused throughout the economy, Wolff’s
law (Freeman, 1982) of decreasing marginal techno-
logical opportunities ultimately brings a slowdown of
economic growth. Although, this is clearly a theory
of technology driven growth, the role for other factors
is vast. Perez (1983) and Von Tunzelmann (1995)
are particularly strong examples of contributions in
which the notion of technological paradigms is linked
to broad institutional change, ﬁrm strategy or industry
dynamics.
This short discussion brings us to the following two
conclusions that will guide our analysis in the remain-
der of this paper:
1. Economicgrowthisﬁrstofallaprocessoftransfor-
mation, not of convergence to a steady state growth
path. The transformation of capitalism involves
interaction of the economic sphere with other do-
mains, such as science and technology, and institu-
tions. This has three major implications. First, that
differencesineconomicgrowth(bothovertimeand
between countries) are hard to predict ex ante, but
often have clear underlying explanatory factors ex
post.Second,thatinthelong-run,economicgrowth
is not a process of general convergence. One might
indeed observe historical periods of convergence
during times when institutions and technological
developments allow this, but periods of divergence
of economic growth must also be expected. Third,
any distinction between trend growth and cyclical
variations around the trend is problematic.
2 Hence, we do not share the view of some long-wave theorists
that this perspective necessarily leads to a postulate of strong
regularity in growth and/or the underlying technological dynamics.1294 J. Fagerberg, B. Verspagen/Research Policy 31 (2002) 1291–1304
2. Technology is a key factor shaping economic
growth, and the changes in growth rates. This
leads to two issues. First, the distinction between
radical and incremental innovation becomes of
crucial interest. Radical innovations open up new
possibilities for long-run changes in the trend rate
of economic growth. When radical (or basic) inno-
vations occur, they disrupt the existing economic
structure and dependencies in the economy. This
leads to changes in growth rates that are (again)
hard to predict in a detailed way ex ante. Incremen-
tal innovations are associated with the diffusion
of the radical innovations throughout the economy
and depend crucially on the speciﬁc historical
and institutional context. It is the analysis of this
diffusion process that is most interesting from an
economic point of view. Second, the (stylized) dis-
tinction between innovation and imitation receives
central importance. Technology cannot be fully
appropriated by the ﬁrm that develops an inno-
vation. With time, technological knowledge spills
over to other ﬁrms and other nations. While inno-
vation (the development of new technology) may
lead to divergence between ﬁrms or nations, im-
itation tends to erode differences in technological
competencies, and hence lead to convergence.3
3. Economic growth: transformation or steady
state?
What evidence is there for the evolutionary hypoth-
esis of economic growth as a non-steady state process
of constant transformation? As argued in the previous
section, this question is very much related to the role
played by qualitative factors such as institutions and
culture. Measurement of these is difﬁcult, although
not completely impossible. Nevertheless, we will
approach the issue here from a purely quantitative
perspective, focusing only on growth rates of GDP
and GDP per capita, thus providing rather indirect
‘evidence’.
3 Since diffusion of innovations takes time, and depends on
‘fuzzy’ institutional factors such as those mentioned above, the
exact mix between innovation and diffusion may lead to turbulent
growth paths. See Silverberg and Verspagen (1995) for a quanti-
tative model that illustrates this point.
The issue of changes in the trend rate of growth has
been investigated in a recent set of papers (Crafts and
Mills, 1996, and the references there). In general, the
methodology used to investigate this question is to
estimate the log of GDP or GDP per capita as a (lin-
ear) function of time, where the slope of the estimated
relationship gives the trend growth rate. Varying this
slope for different periods, and testing for the statisti-
cal signiﬁcance of the differences, gives an indication
of changes in economic growth trends. Although, this
method has intuitive appeal, it has one major dis-
advantage in the present context. The method posits
trend breaks as discontinuous events: the trend growth
rate is assumed to change suddenly from one year to
the other, and then to stay constant for a longer period.
From an evolutionary point of view, one would like
to investigate the possibility of more smooth changes.
One way of dealing with this problem is to estimate
the trend growth rate as a time varying parameter,
as can be done by using the Kalman ﬁlter. In this
way, one may specify the trend growth rate itself as a
(stochastic) function that changes yearly. This is the
method used here. As is commonly done, GDP and
GDP per capita are modeled as a log-linear function of
time. However, both the constant and the slope of this
relation are modeled as time varying parameters in a
Kalman ﬁlter model, i.e. these parameters are assumed
to change on a yearly basis by a stochastic process.4
Fig. 1 gives the Kalman ﬁlter estimations for six of
the countries for which long-time series are available
in Maddison (1995). For the most recent years (up to
1998),Maddison’sdatawereupdatedwiththedatade-
veloped by the Groningen Growth and Development
Centre.5 The ﬁgures give the growth rate of GDP per
capita (left axis, dark line) and the growth rate of GDP
4 The speciﬁc results of the Kalman ﬁlter estimations depend
on a number of parameters, of which the variance factors in the
transition and measurement equations are two important ones.
We inferred the variance factor in the transition equation from a
number of initial estimations, according to the procedure described
as ‘bootstrapping a variance for the transition equation’ in the
TSP 4.4 Reference Manual under the KALMAN command. We
used defaults for all other estimation parameters, among which
the identity matrix for the transition factor in the measurement
equation. However, the results are not very sensitive for these
parameters, especially not for the years in the graphs.
5 The updates were taken from the GGDC Total Econ-
omy Database, University of Groningen, fourth quarter 1999,
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Fig. 1. Trend growth rates of GDP per capita (light line, left axis) and GDP (dark line, right axis), estimated with a Kalman ﬁlter.
(right axis, light line). The results indicate that there
is indeed a great variability in the ‘trend’ growth rates
for these countries over time. Most evidently, the two
world wars cause violent interruptions of trends. For
all countries except Italy the start of the 20th century is
a period of high growth. The early 1910s signify rad-
ical breaks, usually with rapidly falling trend growth
rates. With the two wars, the roaring twenties and the
Great Depression in the 1930s, the next 35 years are
turbulent, with no clear steady state settling in.
After 1950, the European countries and Japan show
a common pattern of rapidly increasing trend growth
rates. In most cases, this strong increase of the trend
brings the countries involved on a path with growth
rates that are higher than ever experienced before in
the 20th century. US is an interesting exception to the1296 J. Fagerberg, B. Verspagen/Research Policy 31 (2002) 1291–1304
Fig. 2. Long-run trends of convergence and divergence.
increasing trend growth rate in the post-World War II
period.The1970sbringawell-documentedbreakwith
thegoldenageofthe1950sand1960s.Inallcountries,
trend growth settles down at a relatively constant level.
It is notable, however, that compared to the end of the
goldenage,thetrendgrowthratesinmostcountriesare
at a similar or just slightly lower level. What is differ-
entinthe1970sand1980sascomparedtotheprevious
period is that the trend growth rates no longer increase.
The 1990s show some ripples in time. Obviously,
compared to the time span of the graph, this period
is rather short for any ﬁrm judgment about possible
reversions of the trend. What is interesting, however, is
the fact that the estimated trends vary greatly between
countries. On one hand, Germany, Italy, and Japan
seem to experience a decrease in the trend. UK and
the US, on the other hand, seem to show signs of an
increase in trend growth.
In summary, the Kalman ﬁlter estimations seem to
show that the concept of steady state growth is not
very useful from an empirical point of view. Growth
paths of countries show a high degree of variability
over time. Periods of rapid and slow(er) growth take
turns, without, however, a clear cyclical pattern with
ﬁxed periodicity. There are some features of historical
growth patterns that seem to be shared by most coun-
tries: generally erratic patterns of trend growth before
1940, a long period of increasing trend growth rates
after the World War II, and slowdown of growth from
the mid-1970s. Despite these common patterns, there
are important differences between countries with re-
spect to the timing of changes in the trend, the level
of growth rates, and the detailed shape of the patterns.
Moreover, there are quite a few exceptions to these
common patterns. Interestingly, the 1990s are a clear
example of the variability of growth trends between
countries. In some countries, one sees a clear pattern
of take off of growth rates, while in others the ﬂat
trend of the 1970s and 1980s is continued.
However, our main interest in this paper is on
comparative growth performance, or the issue of
convergence or divergence of GDP per capita lev-
els. Fig. 2 gives, for a set of 18 countries including
those in Fig. 1 as well as a number of other OECD
countries,6 the long-run trends of convergence. Two
different indicators of differences between countries
are used. The ﬁrst has been used many times in the
convergence–divergence debate. It is deﬁned as the
standard deviation of the log of GDP per capita in
the sample of countries. This is the dark line in Fig. 2.
A falling standard deviation points to convergence
(country differences diminish over time). This mea-
sure essentially compares a country’s GDP per capita
to the (unweighted) sample average.
6 In addition to the countries in Fig. 1, Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland are included. Data are
again taken from Maddison (1995) in combination with the GGDC
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The ﬁgure shows that there was no or little conver-
gence over the period 1870–1913. After this, a weak
trend towards convergence sets in until the outbreak
of World War II. The latter event increases the hetero-
geneity in the sample drastically. From the late 1940s
onwards, a very strong convergence process sets in.
Around 1960, the level of the indicator is back to
whereitwasbeforethewar,butconvergencekeepsgo-
ing on. In the mid-1970s, when trend growth starts to
s l o wd o w ni nFig. 1, convergence also comes to a halt.
For about a decade, per capita income differences re-
main stable. But from the mid-1980s onwards a weak
trend towards convergence may again be observed.
The light line in Fig. 2 gives a different conver-
gence indicator. This indicator is deﬁned as the mean
of the log difference of per capita income in a country
relative to the most advanced country in the sample.
Australia, UK, Switzerland, Germany and the US ap-
pear as countries with the highest value of per capita
GDP in one or more years. During the post-World
War II period, the US are in the lead for most of the
time. This includes the most recent period (from 1983
onwards). Abramovitz and David (1996) suggest that
this indicator ﬁts the idea of catching-up as a result of
technology diffusion relatively well. The reason for
this is that technology diffuses from the relatively ad-
vanced countries to the more backward countries, and
this suggests comparing a country to the productivity
frontier rather than to the sample average.
For the post-war convergence boom and the slow-
down of this in the mid-1970s, the two indicators
match relatively well. However, for the earliest period,
the second indicator points to more convergence than
the ﬁrst one, and the opposite is true for the period
from the start of the 20th century to 1920. Of most im-
mediate interest, however, is the strong divergence of
the two indicators in the most recent period. While the
ﬁrst indicator, which measures convergence relative to
the sample mean, shows weak convergence from 1990
onwards, the second indicator, measuring convergence
relative to the leader in terms of GDP per capita (i.e.
the US), shows relatively strong divergence. In other
words, while the US seems to move ahead of the other
countries on average, this does not imply that these
other countries are not converging to each other.
What is the interpretation of this pattern of develop-
ment? Note, ﬁrst, that the immediate post-war period
seems to provide a clear break with the immediate
past. Another break seems to be encountered some
time during the 1970s. Following our evolutionary in-
terpretation of growth patterns in Section 2, one might
suggest that growth during the period 1950–1975
(roughly) may be driven by different mechanisms than
in the period before or after this. Drawing on the litera-
ture discussed in Section 2, we will tentatively suggest
the following interpretation. The period immediately
following World War II was one in which a set of in-
novations jointly characterized as ‘mass production’
diffused through the economies of the developed part
of the globe (Freeman and Soete, 1997). These tech-
nologies had been pioneered in the US during the
ﬁrst half of the 20th century, for example in the form
of Henry Ford’s assembly belt and the organizational
innovations around this (Taylorism), or a whole bunch
of new products and processes arising from the use of
oil as an energy source and raw material (cracking).
Growth in this period can thus be characterized as
based on the spread of technological knowledge from
the technological leader (the US) to a limited set of
other (mostly already developed) countries. In line
with some of the literature that will be discussed later,
we propose to term this period as one of catching-up
based growth.
Abramovitz (1994), Abramovitz and David (1996)
and Nelson and Wright (1992) have explained how
the spread of this new techno-economic paradigm to
other parts of the world became temporarily deferred,
and how the circumstances after World War II helped
to overcome these barriers. The Bretton Woods sys-
tem, which spurred world trade and hence enabled
even small countries to reap the economies of scale
underlying the mass production paradigm, increased
possibilities for travel and communication over large
distances, and the establishment of the European com-
munity (Fagerberg et al., 1999) were some of the more
important factors in this.
Continuing in time, the period from the mid-1970s
can be seen as one in which the further opportunities
of the mass production paradigm had become depleted
to such an extent that it started to have a negative
impact on growth. This involves both, the gradual de-
pletion of technological opportunities, and an emerg-
ing ‘mismatch’ between the techno-economic and
socio-economic spheres. The latter issue is developed
into much detail in the French literature on ‘regula-
tion theory’ (e.g. Boyer, 1989). With the depletion of1298 J. Fagerberg, B. Verspagen/Research Policy 31 (2002) 1291–1304
opportunities for further growth also came a deple-
tion of opportunities for convergence and catching-up
based growth.
While getting closer to the present, the argu-
ment obviously becomes more and more speculative.
Freeman and Soete (1997), however, argue that there
is evidence for a renewed upswing of economic
growth during the 1990s, this time based on a new
set of radical technological breakthroughs. These are
the set of technologies now jointly referred to as in-
formation and communication technologies (ICTs).
There is obviously some connection between this
hypothesis of an ICT-based upswing of economic
growth as the start of a new ‘long-wave’ and the re-
cent debate about the concept of the ‘new economy’
(on which we will not elaborate here any further).
What such an upswing would imply for the possibil-
ities for catching-up based growth and convergence
is still rather unclear, and worthy of both theoretical
and empirical investigations.
Compressing this already sweeping account of eco-
nomic history of the 20th century even further, we
arrive at a central notion that we will develop further
in terms of empirical estimations for the relationship
between economic growth and technology. The no-
tion is that if we investigate the relationship between
technology-related or catching-up factors and eco-
nomic growth, we should be able to detect structural
changes in this relationship over the breakpoints in
the above historical picture. The exact nature and
direction of these structural changes in the estimated
equations would have to correspond to the broad di-
rections of technology dynamics already outlined in
the narrative history.
4. Innovation-diffusion, convergence and
divergence
Inordertolookattechnologydiffusionandcatch-up
based growth in more details, we will draw on the
technology gap growth model developed by Fagerberg
(1987, 1988b).7 This model, building on Pavitt and
Soete (1982) and others, takes the distinction between
the development of new knowledge (in a country)
and the diffusion of knowledge (between countries)
7 See also Kortum (1997) for a somewhat similar model.
that was mentioned in Section 2 as its point of de-
parture. Fagerberg (1987, p. 88) summarized the
basic hypotheses of this approach in four points as
follows:
(1) There is a close relation between a country’s eco-
nomic and technological level of development.
(2) The rate of economic growth of a country is pos-
itively inﬂuenced by the rate of growth in the
technological level of the country.
(3) It is possible for a country facing a technologi-
cal gap, i.e. a country on a lower technological
level than the countries on ‘the world innovation
frontier’, to increase its rate of economic growth
through imitation or ‘catching-up’.
(5) The rate at which a country exploits the possibil-
ities offered by the technological gap depends on
its ability to mobilize resources for transforming
social, institutional and economic structures.
In an attempt to test the ﬁrst of these four relation-
ships, Fagerberg (1987, 1988b) regressed the level of
GDPpercapitaontwodifferenttechnologyindicators:
external patents per dollar of export, and total R&D
expenditures as a fraction of GDP. The hypothesis was
that this relation should be expected to be log–linear
rather than linear, because countries close to the tech-
nological frontier depend more on the development
of new knowledge (or innovation) than technologi-
cally lagging countries (which were assumed to rely
more on imitating knowledge developed elsewhere,
that is diffusion). Fagerberg’s original regressions,
which were undertaken for selected periods prior
to the early 1980s, conﬁrmed the hypotheses under
test.
Tables 1 and 2 of this paper repeat these tests for
the periods 1966–1972 and 1973–1983 and extend the
time coverage to more recent data (1984–1995 as a
whole and 1990–1995 separately). We use a sample
of 29 countries, including, in addition to the countries
included in Fig. 2, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey.
Some slight differences in the data set compared to
Fagerberg’s original regressions are present. In partic-
ular, while the original data on patents refer to total
external patents (patents by the country’s residents in
all foreign countries), this paper uses data on patent-
ing in the US since this source gives easier access toJ. Fagerberg, B. Verspagen/Research Policy 31 (2002) 1291–1304 1299
Table 1
The relation between GDP per capita and patenting activity
Period Constant EPA Adjusted R2 Fn
1 1966–1972 0.608 (9.47) 0.392 (8.81) 0.75 77.6 28
2 1973–1983 0.650 (12.8) 0.350 (10.3) 0.80 106.8 28
3 1984–1995 0.802 (15.4) 0.198 (6.70) 0.61 44.9 29
4 1990–1995 0.836 (16.3) 0.164 (5.98) 0.55 35.8 29
Note: t-values within brackets.
Table 2
The relation between GDP per capita and R&D intensity (total R&D)
Period Constant RDI Adjusted R2 Fn
1 1966–1972 3.199 (10.5) 2.199 (7.33) 0.68 53.8 26
2 1973–1983 2.611 (8.79) 1.611 (5.49) 0.55 30.1 25
3 1984–1995 2.609 (11.8) 1.609 (7.40) 0.67 54.8 27
4 1990–1995 2.527 (12.4) 1.527 (7.60) 0.69 57.8 27
Note: t-values within brackets.
data for non-OECD countries.8 Also, while Fagerberg
used civil R&D (total R&D less military R&D), this
paper uses total R&D since the latter is available for a
larger span of countries. We also test a slightly mod-
iﬁed version of Fagerberg’s original log–linear equa-
tion, in order to be better able to compare regression
coefﬁcients over time, and interpret the differences.
The equation we test is the following one:
Ti
¯ T




where T is GDP per capita, X either a patenting vari-
able or an R&D variable (deﬁned precisely later), e
the usual error term, c and a the coefﬁcients to be es-
timated, the subscript i indicates a country, and a bar
above a variable indicates an average over the sample
of countries. Note that the variables are standardized
such that the sample means are equal to one (for a
variable X with mean ln(X) positive) or minus one
8 We compared data on total external patenting and data on
patenting in the US to each other for the OECD countries in the
sample. There are three countries that are clear outliners in the
total sample for the complete period under consideration. These are
the US (because of a ‘home market effect’), Canada (similar) and
Japan. We adjusted the data for these three countries downwardly
in such a way that the ratio between their value for total external
patenting and the mean value of that variable of Germany, UK and
France is replicated in the US patenting data. Details available on
request.
(for a variable X with mean ln(X) negative) for each
period. This implies that the regression coefﬁcients in
different periods in time are not affected by shifts in
the means of the variables.9
Table 1 gives the relation between GDP per capita
and patenting per billion dollar exports (EPA), Table 2
for R&D intensity, which is deﬁned as total R&D as
a fraction of GDP. The correlations between the eco-
nomic and technological levels of development are in
both cases positive and signiﬁcant for all time periods.
It is clear from Tables 1 and 2 that the estimated co-
efﬁcient a decreases over time, and more so in the case
of patents than in the case of R&D. What does this
imply? The lower slope means that a given increase
in relative GDP per capita requires a larger increase
in relative innovative activity (patenting) in the 1990s
than it did one or two decades earlier. Hence, one way
to put it would be to say that it has become techno-
logically more demanding to catch-up economically.
A possible interpretation might be that this reﬂects in-
creasing technological divergence in the global econ-
omy between, on one hand, a group of technological
leaderswhocompetenecktoneckwitheachother,and
9 Note that because every regression line has to go through the
point corresponding to the means of the dependent and indepen-
dent variable, the standardization procedure also implies that the
coefﬁcients a and c will add to one when the mean of ln(X)i s
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on the other a group of laggards for which technologi-
cal competition in the form of patenting becomes less
andlessrelevant.10 Thefactthatthistendencyissome-
what more manifest for patents than for R&D might be
explained by the fact that R&D is a broader measure
of, say, technological capability than patents and that
R&D continue to be of high relevance also for poorer
economies that wish to catch-up through imitation.
A really thorough analysis of such changes in dy-
namics between technology and economic growth,
however, requires a more dynamic framework than
the static correlations studied so far. Hence, what is
done in the following is to re-estimate the dynamic
speciﬁcation of the technology gap growth model,
based on points 2–4 earlier (see Fagerberg, 1988b
for the formal model). The dependent variable is the
average annual compound growth rate of GDP. The
model explains economic growth as the joint outcome
of three sets of factors:
• innovation (a possible source of divergence, mea-
sured through patent growth),
• the potential for diffusion (a possible source of con-
vergence, proxied by the level of productivity or
GDP per capita) and
• complementary factors that contribute to the ex-
ploitation of this potential (absorptive capacity).
Among the complementary factors inﬂuencing
the realization of catch-up potential, we include—as
in the original model (Fagerberg, 1987, 1988b)—
investment as a fraction of GDP (average over the
period indicated). In addition, we include two vari-
ables reﬂecting the industrial structure of the country,
the share of manufacturing and services, respectively,
in GDP. While investment is generally viewed as a
growth-inducing factor (although, it is sometimes held
to be endogenous), the inclusion of the structural vari-
ables may be more controversial. Manufacturing was
included to take into account the argument brought
forward by Cornwall (1977) and others of ‘manu-
facturing as an engine of growth’, i.e. that manufac-
turing is technologically much more dynamic than
other sectors of the economy and therefore should be
10 This issue is explored in somewhat more detail in the working
paper version of this paper which is available on request from
the Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture, University of
Oslo, P.O. Box 1108, Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway.
regarded as a growth-inducing factor in its own right.
However, it is commonly argued that this positive role
for manufacturing is now (and has long been) history,
and that the role of ‘engine of growth’—or ‘carrier
branch’ for the most progressive technologies of the
day has been taken over by the services sector. To take
into account this possibility, we include the share of
services in GDP as a possible complementary factor.
The model is estimated for the pooled sample of ob-
servations of 29 countries and the three time periods as
used (1966–1972, 1973–1983, 1984–1995). To check
for changes in the working of the variables over time
we introduce time-slope dummies (TSDs) for the ﬁrst
two periods. In the case of variables for which there
is no signiﬁcant TSD effect,11 the reported coefﬁcient
holdsforallthreeperiods.However,incasesforwhich
the TSD effect was found to be signiﬁcant, the TSD
effect must be added to the estimate of the variable to
obtain the coefﬁcient for the relevant period. To check
for the possible impact of spatial correlation (espe-
cially an ‘Asia effect’) we also report estimates for
a versions of the model that includes continent dum-
mies. Finally, to allow for the possibility that changes
over time are inﬂuenced by other non-included fac-
tors, we include a version with time dummies. The
results from the estimations are reported in Table 3.12
The main lessons to be drawn from the estimations
are the following:
(1) In general, the test conﬁrms the basic hypotheses
underlying the model, i.e. that innovation, diffu-
sion potential and other (complementary) factors
related to the exploitation of this potential matter
for economic growth.
(2) The scope for diffusion, as measured by GDP per
capita (log form), appears to be lower after 1983
than it previously was (especially when compared
to the 1973–1983 period).
11 This means that the inclusion of the dummy could not be
defended on statistical grounds, i.e. that it failed to reduce the
residual variance, using a backward search.
12 Sources for the data: Maddison (1995), Groningen Growth and
Development Centre website, OECD Economic Outlook Historical
Statistics (various issues), World Development Report CD-ROM
(version 2000), World Development Report (various issues), US
Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce, OECD Basic Science and Tech-
nology Indicators Database (various issues), UNESCO Statistical
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Table 3
Estimation results for the technology gap growth model, 1966–1995
(1) (2) (3)
Constant −0.007 (0.34) −0.007 (0.25) 0.029 (1.26)
ln of initial GDP −0.023 (3.96) −0.020 (3.07) −0.012 (1.74)
TSD second period −0.021 (2.27) −0.025 (2.45) −0.017 (2.00)
TSD ﬁrst period −0.011 (2.09) −0.015 (2.12) −0.017 (2.35)
Investment 0.0014 (4.07) 0.0014 (3.99) 0.00073 (1.86)
TSD ﬁrst period – – 0.0018 (2.38)
Patents 0.160 (4.35) 0.161 (4.34) 0.103 (3.04)
TSD second period −0.094 (1.98) −0.098 (2.03) −0.031 (0.85)
TSD ﬁrst period −0.117 (2.30) −0.133 (2.47) −0.134 (2.44)
Manufacturing −0.0003 (0.56) −0.00023 (0.35) −0.00016 (0.34)
TSD second period 0.00087 (1.47) 0.0011 (1.17) –
TSD ﬁrst period 0.0018 (3.20) 0.0016 (2.08) 0.00083 (1.76)
Services 0.0010 (2.76) 0.00085 (2.05) 0.00043 (1.15)
TSD second period 0.00058 (1.46) 0.0099 (1.42) 0.00077 (2.08)
Europe dummy – – −0.0183 (3.21)
America dummy – – −0.0122 (1.43)
Australia dummy – – −0.0182 (2.29)
First period dummy – 0.015 (0.68) –
Second period dummy – −0.020 (0.46) –
Adjusted R2 0.715 0.710 0.756
N 76 76 76
Note: t-statistics within brackets. For deﬁnition of variables, see the text.
(3) The importance of innovation (as measured by
patent growth) for economic growth appears to in-
crease over time. The impact is especially signif-
icant in the most recent period.
(4) The opposite holds for the role of manufacturing
which had a much more positive and signiﬁcant
impact before 1973, than it is shown to have later.
Services, on the other hand, were found to have a
positive impact in all three periods, with the most
pronounced effect between 1973 and 1983.
(5) The introduction of time and continent dummies
did not have a large impact on the results, but
the latter increased the explanatory power of the
model signiﬁcantly, suggesting that there may be
something to the idea of an ‘Asia effect’.
To chart out how this adds to the explanation of
growth rate differentials between countries, we report
in Table 4 a decomposition of the differences in eco-
nomic growth between the leader country, US and
other country groupings. There are several interesting
features. The ﬁrst is that although the model is shown
to explain most differences in growth rather well,
it clearly fails to reproduce the time proﬁle of the
growth performance of Japan, with spectacularly high
growth before 1973 and much lower growth recently.
The model would have suggested a smoother picture.
Second, it clearly points to the scope for diffusion as
the most important factor behind catch-up and growth
(even in the most recent period). Investment plays a
more subordinate role except for Japan. Differences
in innovation (patent growth) also explains relatively
little initially, but emerges as a very powerful factor
in the most recent period, in which it turns up as the
single most important factor behind the continuing
high growth of the Asian NICs. Before 1983, the
high growth of the Asian NICs was mainly explained
by the large scope for diffusion, now this matters
much less for these countries, and has had to give
way to innovation as the major growth-inducing fac-
tor. Finally, it should be noted that structural factors
were indeed important in explaining the difference in
growth between the US and other country groupings.
In particular, it seems to be the case that the relatively
important role played by services in the US econ-
omy has been a major growth-inducing factor there,
explaining to some extent the failure of most other
economies to catch-up. Initially, the US was also1302 J. Fagerberg, B. Verspagen/Research Policy 31 (2002) 1291–1304
Table 4













Japan 6.3 3.48 1.90 1.53 0.11 1.29 −1.36
EU NICs 3.5 1.86 3.04 0.35 0.05 −0.64 −0.93
Other EU 1.2 1.27 1.25 0.64 0.04 0.13 −0.80
Western offshoots 0.9 0.30 0.91 0.27 0.04 −0.34 −0.58
Asian NICs 6.8 4.35 5.21 −0.16 0.044 −0.33 −0.40
Developing 3.1 2.83 6.92 −0.82 0.05 −1.57 −1.73
1973–1983
Japan 1.2 2.77 1.53 1.63 0.67 0.44 −1.51
EU niches 0.3 2.53 3.20 0.50 0.16 0.04 −1.38
Other EU 0 1.28 1.22 0.42 0.21 0.12 −0.70
Western offshoots 0.1 0.86 1.05 0.33 0.35 −0.10 −0.77
Asian NICs 5.2 6.00 4.68 0.76 1.19 0.15 −0.78
Developing 3.5 4.44 7.93 −0.12 −0.33 −0.15 −2.86
1984–1995
Japan 0.6 1.12 0.44 1.72 0.43 −0.25 −1.22
EU niches 0.6 0.60 1.61 −0.35 0.24 −0.04 −0.847
Other EU −0.2 −0.07 0.59 0.02 −0.12 −0.07 −0.49
Western offshoots 0.2 0.41 0.61 0.33 −0.11 0.042 −0.46
Asian NICs 4.6 4.41 1.39 0.73 3.20 −0.16 −0.73
Developing 3.0 2.78 3.96 −0.005 1.17 −0.13 −2.21
Note on country groupings: European NICs: Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Spain; other European countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Denmark, Finland, France, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden; Western offshoots: Canada, Australia, New Zealand; Asian NICs:
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hongkong; developing: Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Turkey; for deﬁnition of explanatory variables, see the
text.
helped by its relatively high specialization compared
to most other economies (except Japan) but this effect
soon faded away and has since the early 1980s been
of negligible importance.
5. Conclusions
The empirical analysis of this paper started with
a discussion about the character of economic growth
at the country level. It was concluded that changes in
the trend rate of economic growth over time, or dif-
ferences in the growth performance of countries are
too numerous for the notion of a steady state to be
interesting. Economic growth seems to be a process
of constant transformation rather than adjustment to a
long-run ﬁxed target. The most recent period (the last
year included in the analysis is 1998) is an interesting
example of these issues. The 1990s show both large
differences in trend growth between countries, and
for some countries, the ﬁrst signs of what might be a




per capita in the OECD area. Convergence can either
be relative to the (OECD) average value of GDP per
capita, or relative to the leader country. For most of the
20th century, and certainly for the post-1950 period,
the two indicators have shown very similar trends. The
1990s form, however, a break with this pattern. While
convergence to the sample mean is still going on at a
pace that is more or less comparable to that observed
since the mid-1970s, divergence is taking place for the
indicator based on differences relative to the leading
country (in this case the US). In other words, the USJ. Fagerberg, B. Verspagen/Research Policy 31 (2002) 1291–1304 1303
seem to be ‘running away’ from the other countries,
while the latter are still, by and large, converging to
the sample mean. The results on take-off of economic
growth at the country level summarized at the start
of this section suggest that besides the US, there may
be some other countries that are also ‘running away’.
These results are based on relatively few observations,
so care must be taken in extrapolating them into the
future.
The evolutionary approaches to economic growth
that we discussed suggest that radical innovations are
important for economic growth, and especially for
changes in trend growth. With the empirical evidence
and the interpretation of this discussed earlier, one is
tempted to conclude that ICTs are a recent example
of such radical innovations. We have in this paper not
been able to take this element sufﬁciently into account,
which we will attempt to do in future work. However,
we hold it as likely that the changes in global growth
dynamics that have been researched in this paper are
related to the increasing role of ICT in the world econ-
omy, and that the latter is one potential source for
divergence. For instance, evidence based on data on
the diffusion of several types of ICT equipment and
services (mobile telephones, computers, Internet, etc.)
suggest a very uneven rate of diffusion of new ICT
(Dalum et al., 1999; OECD, 1999).
There are also other omens of future divergence in
the world economy. The re-estimation of an applied
‘evolutionary’ growth model, based on what we—
following Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter—
call ‘appreciative evolutionary theorizing’, suggests
two major forms of transformation in the technology–
economy domain. The ﬁrst is that diffusion in some
sense seems to have become more ‘difﬁcult’ and de-
manding over time. Again, we think that this may
be a reﬂection of the radical technological change in
the last decades, with ICT-based solutions substitut-
ing earlier mechanical and electromechanical ones,
and the derived change in the demand for skills and
infrastructure. The second is that innovation, as mea-
sured by patenting activity, becomes more important
over time. Particularly, at the technology frontier,
the differences between countries in terms of ‘pure’
innovative efforts (as primarily indicated by patents,
hence not including catching-up) become more and
more important for explaining differences in growth
performance. Both tendencies arguably increase the
probability of divergence in the world economy.13 We
may very well be there already.
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